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ABSTRACT
Physical layer security aspects of wireless networks have re-
cently attracted an increased attention due to the emergence
of large-scale decentralized networks. While most existing
literature focuses on link-level performance analysis from the
perspective of the wireless users, this paper turns the atten-
tion to the eavesdroppers’ (attacker) side of the problem.
In this context, we introduce a model that enables a num-
ber of single antenna eavesdroppers in a wireless network
to cooperate, by performing distributed receive beamform-
ing, for improving the damage that they inflict on the net-
work’s wireless users when tapping through their transmis-
sions. We model the eavesdroppers cooperation problem as
a non-transferable coalitional game and we propose a dis-
tributed algorithm for coalition formation. The proposed
algorithm allows the eavesdroppers to take autonomous deci-
sions to cooperate and form coalitions, while maximizing the
damage that they cause on the wireless users. This damage
is quantified in terms of the overall secrecy capacity reduc-
tion that the eavesdroppers incur on the users while taking
into account cooperation costs in terms of the time required
for information exchange. We analyze the resulting coali-
tional structures, discuss their properties, and study how
the eavesdroppers can adapt the topology to environmental
changes such as mobility. Simulation results show that the
proposed algorithm allows the eavesdroppers to cooperate
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the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign and was supported by the Re-
search Council of Norway through projects 183311/S10,
176773/S10, and 18778/V11.
and self-organize while achieving an improvement of the av-
erage payoff per eavesdropper up to 27.6% per eavesdropping
cycle relative to the non-cooperative case.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the
physical layer (PHY) security aspects of wireless networks.
The main motivation is that higher-layer techniques, such as
encryption, are too complex and hard to implement in decen-
tralized and large-scale wireless networks. Hence, the study
of the PHY security of these networks has become of ma-
jor interest. The main idea is to study the wireless channel
PHY characteristics and their implications on the reliability
and security of wireless transmission which is quantified us-
ing the secrecy capacity. The secrecy capacity is defined as
the maximum rate of secret information sent from a node to
its destination in the presence of eavesdroppers. The study
of this security aspect began with pioneering work of Wyner
over the wire-tap channel [1] which showed the possibility
of having an almost perfectly secure communication with-
out any reliance on secret keys. This work was followed up
in [2, 3] for the scalar Gaussian wire-tap channel and the
broadcast channel, respectively.
A significant amount of research has been recently devoted
to carrying out these PHY security studies unto the wire-
less and the multi-user channels [4–9]. For instance, in [4]
and [5], the authors study the secrecy capacity region for
both the Gaussian and the fading broadcast channels and
propose optimal power allocation strategies. In [6], the se-
crecy level in multiple access channels from a link-level per-
spective is studied. For improving the users’ secrecy capac-
ities, multiple antenna systems have been proposed in [7,8],
notably when the channel between the source and the desti-
nation is worse than the channel between the source and
the eavesdroppers. Further, the possibility of benefiting
from these multiple antenna gains is studied in [9] and [10]
through cooperation among the users. Briefly, the majority
of the existing literature is devoted to the information the-
oretic analysis, from the perspective of the network’s users,
of link-level performance gains of secure communications.
However, there is a lack of literature that studies how the
eavesdroppers can behave for improving their eavesdropping
capabilities, notably at the system-level. In fact, to the best
of our knowledge, no work has investigated how a number
of eavesdroppers can interact at the network-wide level in
order to launch efficient eavesdropping attacks on a network
of wireless users.
The main contributions of this work are three-fold: (i) To
introduce a cooperation protocol that allows a network of
eavesdroppers to interact for improving their eavesdropping
performance, (ii) To propose an adequate utility function for
the eavesdroppers that accounts for the cooperation gains
and costs, and (iii) To model the problem using coalitional
games and introduce a distributed algorithm for coalition
formation among the eavesdroppers. In other words, while
existing work focused mainly on the users’ side in PHY secu-
rity problems, we seek to study the eavesdroppers’ perspec-
tive while proposing cooperative strategies. For this pur-
pose, we model the eavesdroppers cooperation problem as a
non-transferable coalitional game and we propose an algo-
rithm for distributed coalition formation constructed using
well suited concepts from cooperative games. Using the pro-
posed algorithm, the eavesdroppers in a wireless network
can autonomously decide to form or break a coalition for
maximizing their utilities. These utilities account for the
gain from cooperation, in terms of the average reduction of
the overall secrecy capacity incurred on the users (damage
caused by the eavesdroppers) as well as the costs in terms of
the time needed for information exchange among the eaves-
droppers. We show that, due to the cost for cooperation, in-
dependent disjoint eavesdroppers coalitions will form in the
network. We study and discuss the properties of these re-
sulting coalitional structures. Simulation results show that
the proposed algorithm allows the eavesdroppers to coop-
erate and self-organize while achieving an improvement of
the average payoff (overall secrecy capacity reduction) per
eavesdropper up to 27.6% per eavesdropping cycle relative
to the non-cooperative case. The simulations also show how
the eavesdroppers can adapt the network’s topology to en-
vironmental changes such as mobility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the system model. Section 3 presents the game for-
mulation and properties. In Section 4, we devise the coali-
tion formation algorithm. Simulation results are presented
and analyzed in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section 6.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 Non-Cooperative Eavesdropping Model
Consider a network having K single antenna eavesdroppers
(static or mobile) seeking to tap into the transmissions of
N wireless transmitters that are sending data to a central
base station (BS). Denote K and N as the sets of eaves-
droppers and users, respectively. We consider that each
eavesdropper can only eavesdrop on one user at a time1. In
a non-cooperative manner, we consider that, at any given
1Simultaneous eavesdropping by a single eavesdropper on
multiples users requires complex computational and signal
processing techniques that are hard to integrate namely
when the eavesdroppers are small mobile devices and the
number of users is large.
point in time, all K eavesdroppers are interested in the
information being sent by only one user i ∈ N . Hence,
we consider a time slotted system whereby during a sin-
gle slot all K eavesdroppers, each acting on its own (non-
cooperatively), attempt to tap into the transmission of one
of the N users in the network2. The eavesdroppers can at-
tack the users in any arbitrary manner over the slots. Due
to the non-cooperative and independent behavior of these
attacks (which are also ergodic over time), this model can
be captured, for convenience, by a round robin system op-
eration. Hence, in slot 1, we consider that all eavesdroppers
are non-cooperatively attacking User 1, in slot 2, all eaves-
droppers are non-cooperatively attacking User 2, and so on
until all N users are attacked once by the eavesdroppers.
Consequently, a total of N slots is required for completing
one round of eavesdropping on all N users. Every block of
N slots will be referred to as the eavesdropping cycle and
the eavesdroppers engage in multiple eavesdropping cycles
over time.
Moreover, as the wireless channel is time varying, the dura-
tion of every time slot is considered to be equal to the coher-
ence time θc of the channel (assumed to be the same for all
channels in the model) which is defined as the time during
which the channel is considered as invariant. Hence, within
a slot, the eavesdroppers can launch an attack knowing that
the channels do not vary during the slot. The coherence
time is generally given by [11, Eq. (4.40.c)]
θc =
0.423
fd
(1)
where fd is the maximal Doppler frequency (for stationary
eavesdroppers/users this frequency has a value of a few hertz
and can increase with increased mobility [11, Sec. 4.4.3]).
During a single eavesdropping cycle (N slots), the objective
of every eavesdropper is to maximize the damage caused
on the users, which translates into minimizing the secrecy
capacities of all N users (during one cycle). In this regard,
the total damage that an eavesdropper k ∈ K is able to
inflict on the transmitters through a single eavesdropping
cycle can be quantified using the overall reduction of the
secrecy capacities that k yielded, as follows
u(k) =
∑
i∈N
(
C
d
i − C
e
k,i
)+
, (2)
where Cdi = W · log2 (1 +
g2i,BS·P˜
σ2
) is the capacity of user
i ∈ N achieved at the BS with gi,BS being the channel gain
between i and the BS, W being the available bandwidth, P˜
being the transmit power of user i (assumed the same for
all users in N ), and σ2 the variance of the Gaussian noise.
Further, Cek,i = W · log2 (1 +
g2i,k·P˜
σ2
) is the capacity received
at eavesdropper k from user i. In this paper, we consider a
quasi-static channel model where the channel gain gi,j be-
tween any two nodes (users-base station, eavesdropper-user,
or eavesdropper-eavesdropper) is given by [11]
gi,j = a ·
√
d
−µ
i,j (3)
2This model is selected without loss of generality since our
analysis and algorithm can easily accommodate the case
where each eavesdropper may select a different user to tap
into within a slot.
where di,j is the distance between nodes i and j, µ the path
loss exponent, and a is a Rayleigh distributed fading ampli-
tude with a variance of 1 which is stable over the duration
of a slot but changes from one slot to the other (quasi-static
channel).
Further, we remark that in (2) every element (Cdi − C
e
k,i)
+
of the summation represents the secrecy capacity that user
i ∈ N achieves when its signal is being tapped into by eaves-
dropper k. Hence, each element of the summation quan-
tifies the damage that eavesdropper k is able to cause on
user i when tapping into its signal during the correspond-
ing time slot. The eavesdroppers aim at minimizing the
summation in (2) in every eavesdropping cycle by maximiz-
ing the damage caused through the eavesdropping capacities
Cek,i, ∀k ∈ K, i ∈ N . Due to the fading and path loss of
the eavesdropper-user channel, these eavesdropping capac-
ities may be small, thus, reducing the overall effectiveness
of the eavesdropping process of all eavesdroppers. Hence,
efficient techniques for combatting this fading is needed by
the eavesdroppers in order to improve their performance.
2.2 Cooperative Eavesdropping Model
Recently, distributed cooperation among single antenna wire-
less nodes has been proposed [9,12,13] as an effective mean
for improving the quality of the transmitted or received sig-
nal by exploiting spatial diversity. A key technique in this
area is collaborative beamforming whereby the radio sig-
nals transmitted from (transmit beamforming) or received
by (receive beamforming) a set of single-antenna users with
non-directional antennas can be combined using advanced
signal processing techniques for improving the performance
(capacity, signal-to-noise ratio, etc.) of the wireless system
by cooperatively directing the antenna beam [13–17].
In this context, for improving their performance in terms
of eavesdropping capacities, the eavesdroppers in our model
can cooperate by forming groups of eavesdroppers known as
coalitions. Within every coalition, the eavesdroppers utilize
collaborative receive beamforming techniques for minimiz-
ing the secrecy capacities achieved by the users through an
increase in the eavesdropping capacities achieved. Thus, ev-
ery coalition S ⊆ K can be seen as a single eavesdropper
with multiple receive antennas and, within a single slot, this
coalition can collaboratively tap into the signal of one of the
users. For every coalition S, a two-stage cooperation pro-
tocol is proposed whereby the coalition divides its slot into
two durations as follows (this protocol is used every slot to
eavesdrop on a particular user i ∈ N ):
1. In a first duration of the slot, each eavesdropper k
broadcasts its information (channel, control, etc.) to
the other members of coalition S. This is the informa-
tion exchange stage which is performed sequentially by
the eavesdroppers in S.
2. In the remaining time of the slot, the members of coali-
tion S engage in cooperative receive beamforming, i.e.,
the coalition directs its beam towards user i that is
currently being tapped into.
Consequently, analogous to the non-cooperative network op-
eration, in a cooperative manner, during an eavesdropping
cycle, each time slot, all the coalitions (each coalition acting
on its own) eavesdrop on one user i ∈ N in a round robin
Figure 1: An illustrative example of the proposed
system model for eavesdroppers cooperation.
manner. An illustrative example of the network operation in
the cooperative and non-cooperative case is shown in Fig. 1
for K = 8 eavesdroppers, N = 5 users, and 3 coalitions.
For performing receive beamforming, it is well known [12]
that the optimal SNR maximizing technique for combining
the received signals and directing the beam towards a par-
ticular direction is through maximal ratio combining (MRC)
[14]. Hence, within every coalition, the eavesdroppers per-
form MRC for maximizing the SNR received from the users,
consequently reducing the secrecy capacities of these users.
In this regard, the eavesdropping capacity CeS,i of a coalition
S ⊆ K which performs MRC receive beamforming while tap-
ping into the signal of user i ∈ N is given by [12,15,16]
C
e
S,i = W · log2
(
1 +
P˜ · ‖h‖2
σ2
)
(4)
where h is the |S| × 1 channel vector, where each row el-
ement hk = gi,k with gi,k the channel gain between user i
and eavesdropper k ∈ S as given by (3). By achieving the
eavesdropping capacity of (4), the eavesdroppers can cer-
tainly improve the damage incurred on the users as clearly
seen by combining (4) with (2).
However, during the first stage of the cooperation protocol,
i.e., the information exchange stage between the eavesdrop-
pers, the users are able to transmit securely without being
overheard by the eavesdroppers since the eavesdroppers are
engaged in exchanging their channel and control informa-
tion. Thus, the information exchange time yields a cost for
cooperation on the eavesdroppers, in terms of security, since
the users are able to securely communicate in this period.
Moreover, during this first duration, the users can overhear
the information exchange among the eavesdroppers (act as
eavesdroppers on the eavesdroppers!) and, thus, detect the
presence of the eavesdropping threat which also constitutes
a cost for cooperation that the eavesdroppers must account
for when evaluating the effectiveness of their attack through
(2) and (4).
Accordingly, consider a coalition S that is operating to eaves-
drop on a user i ∈ N during a given slot. Within the first
duration of the slot every eavesdropper k ∈ S exchanges its
information with the members of S by sending its data to
the farthest member kˆ = arg max
l∈S
(dk,l) in S as the other
members of S can simultaneously receive this information
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel. Due
to the possibility that the users may tap into the informa-
tion exchange of the eavesdroppers, the rate at which an
eavesdropper k ∈ S exchanges its information is the secrecy
capacity achieved by k while user i (the user being targeted
by S in the slot) is considered as an eavesdropper which is
given by
C
exch
k,kˆ,i
=
(
Ck,kˆ − C
e
i,k
)+
, (5)
where Ck,kˆ = W· log2
(
1 +
P
k,kˆ
·g2
k,kˆ
σ2
)
is the transmit capac-
ity for information exchange between eavesdropper k and
the farthest eavesdropper kˆ with Pk,kˆ the transmit power
of eavesdropper k, and Cei,k = W· log2
(
1 +
P
k,kˆ
·g2k,i
σ2
)
is the
capacity with which user i is able to tap into the information
exchange transmission between the eavesdroppers. Without
any loss of generality, we assume Pk,kˆ = P˜ , ∀k ∈ K.
By using (5) we can deduce the fraction of time θik re-
quired for information exchange (without being tapped into
by transmitter i ∈ N ) between an eavesdropper k ∈ S and
the other members of coalition S (applicable to the slot when
the coalition’s beam is directed towards user i) as follows
θ
i
k =
(
θi
k,kˆ
θc
)
, (6)
where θc is the coherence time given by (1) and
θ
i
k,kˆ
=
L
Cexch
k,kˆ,i
(7)
is the time it takes for eavesdropper k ∈ S to send a packet
of L bits (containing channel, control, and cooperation in-
formation) to the farthest eavesdropper kˆ ∈ S, i.e., exchange
information with the other members of S, with Cexch
k,kˆ,i
given
by (5). Hence, as the eavesdroppers in S exchange their
data sequentially, the total time consumed by coalition S
for information exchange when eavesdropping on user i is
θS,i =
(∑
k∈S
θ
i
k,kˆ
)−
, (8)
with a− , min (a, 1). Clearly, the cost θS,i accounts for
both types of cooperation costs previously mentioned: (i)
The time for information exchange during which users are
transmitting securely as well as (ii) The possibility that the
users may overhear the transmission between the eavesdrop-
pers during information exchange.
Given the cost θS,i, the total secrecy capacity reduction that
a coalition S can cause on the users during an eavesdropping
cycle can be given by
u(S) =
∑
i∈N
(
θS,i · C
d
i + (1− θS,i)
(
C
d
i − C
e
S,i
)+)
, (9)
where CeS,i is the receive beamforming eavesdropping capac-
ity given in (4) and θS,i the time cost given in (8). Note
that, if S is a singleton, then u(S) reduces to the expres-
sion given in (2) (for a singleton coalition of size 1 there
is no information exchange, i.e., θS,i = 0). Every element
in the summation of (9) represents the secrecy capacity re-
duction for the slot where S was eavesdropping on a user
i ∈ N using the two stage cooperative protocol previously
proposed. For instance, during the eavesdroppers informa-
tion exchange θS,i duration, user i is able to transmit freely
with no eavesdropping, hence the term θS,i ·C
d
i . For the re-
maining slot duration (1− θS,i), coalition S is able to eaves-
drop on user i with an improved performance due to the
receive beamforming gain as exhibited by CeS,i in the term
(1− θS,i)
(
Cdi − C
e
S,i
)+
. The objective of the eavesdroppers
(coalitions) is to minimize (9), hence, maximizing the dam-
age on the users.
For a better understanding of (9) one can consider some
extreme cases. For example, when the eavesdroppers in a
coalition S spend the whole time slot duration θc for in-
formation exchange when eavesdropping on a user i, i.e.,
θS,i = 1, then user i would have already transmitted all of
its data without any tapping and in this case, cooperation
is not beneficial for attacking i (although it may be ben-
eficial for eavesdropping on another user j 6= i in another
time slot). On the other hand, if θS,i = 0, then coalition
S spends no time for information exchange, and, hence, the
attack on user i is most efficient as the coalition S is able
to perform receive beamforming on user i during the whole
slot duration θc.
Having laid out the key components of the proposed eaves-
droppers cooperation protocol, the rest of the paper is ded-
icated to investigate how a network of eavesdroppers can,
in a distributed manner, perform this cooperation and form
coalitions such as in Fig. 1 taking into account the various
performance metrics previously described.
3. EAVESDROPPERS COOPERATION AS A
COALITION FORMATION GAME
For mathematically modeling the eavesdroppers cooperation
problem, we refer to coalitional game theory [18, 19] which
provides a set of analytical tools suitable for modeling prob-
lems such as the one proposed in Section 2. In fact, the
introduced eavesdroppers cooperation problem can be mod-
eled as a coalitional game with a non-transferable utility
which is defined as follows [18, Chap. 9]:
Definition 1. A coalitional game with non-transferable
utility is defined by a pair (K, V ) where K is the set of play-
ers and V is a mapping such that for every coalition S ⊆ K,
V (S) is a closed convex subset of R|S| that contains the pay-
off vectors that players in S can achieve.
In other words, a coalitional game has a non-transferable
utility whenever the total utility achieved by any coalition
S cannot be arbitrarily distributed among the members of
S, hence, there is a need for a set of payoff vectors, i.e., the
mapping V to describe the utilities achieved by the players
in a coalition S. In the eavesdroppers cooperation model,
the set of eavesdroppers K is the set of players in the coali-
tional game. In addition, given a coalition S and denoting
by φk(S) the payoff of eavesdropper k ∈ S achieved during
an eavesdropping cycle, we highlight the following property
Property 1. The proposed cooperative eavesdropping game
has a non-transferable utility where the payoff φk(S) received
by any eavesdropper k ∈ S during one eavesdropping cycle,
i.e., the overall secrecy capacity reduction caused during one
cycle by eavesdropper k when acting as part of S, is equal to
the overall secrecy capacity reduction u(S) achieved by the
coalition S as given by (9).
Proof. Over an eavesdropping cycle, the presence of any
coalition of eavesdroppers S ⊆ K implies that the maxi-
mum total secrecy capacity that the users in N can achieve
is given by u(S) in (9) which also represents the utility
achieved by S. Clearly, this damage is a result of the con-
tribution of every member of S. Consequently, one can see
that the overall reduction in secrecy capacity that any eaves-
dropper k ∈ S incurs on the users in N is given by the re-
duction that the coalition S induced on these users. Hence,
φk(S) = u(S), ∀k ∈ S. Consequently, this structure of the
game implies that the value u(S) of any coalition S as given
by (9) cannot be distributed in an arbitrary manner between
the members, since φk(S) = u(S) and thus the game has a
non-transferable utility.
Given Property 1, the mapping V for the eavesdroppers
coalitional game can be defined as follows:
V (S) = {φ(S) ∈ R|S|| φk(S) = −u(S), ∀k ∈ S}, (10)
where φ(S) is a vector of payoffs achieved during one eaves-
dropping cycle by the eavesdroppers when acting in coalition
S, u(S) is the overall secrecy capacity reduction incurred on
the users in N as given by (9), and the minus sign is inserted
in front of u(S) in the payoff φk(S) for convenience to turn
the game into a maximization problem (the objective of the
eavesdroppers is initially to minimize u(S)). Clearly, the set
V (S) in the proposed game is a singleton set since a coalition
S can only achieve a single utility value as dictated by (9).
Consequently, this set is closed and convex, and the eaves-
droppers cooperation problem is cast into a (K, V ) coali-
tional game with non-transferable utility where the eaves-
droppers aim to maximize their payoffs, hence, minimize
the overall secrecy capacity achieved by the users (achieve
maximum damage on the users) by forming coalitions.
Moreover, as explained in the previous section, the damage
achieved by any coalition as per (9) takes into account a cost
for cooperation. Consequently, given the cost of information
exchange, we remark the following for the eavesdroppers co-
operation coalitional game.
Property 2. For the proposed (K, V ) coalitional game,
the grand coalition of all the users seldom forms due to the
presence of a cost for cooperation. Hence, independent dis-
joint coalitions will appear in the network.
Proof. Consider a number of eavesdroppers positioned
at different locations within the network. While coopera-
tion improves the eavesdropping performance as per (4) and
(9), this improvement is limited by the cost for cooperation
given in (8). For instance, by closely investigating the cost
for cooperation one can easily see that the cost grows as:
(i)- The number of eavesdroppers in the coalition increase
as seen in (8), and (ii)- As the channel (distance) between
the eavesdroppers in the coalition, as well as the channel
(distance) between the eavesdroppers and the users varies
as seen through (5) and (7). As a simple example, by con-
sidering a network of two eavesdroppers separated by a very
large distance, the time required for information exchange
as per (8) can be close to 1, hence yielding no benefit for
cooperation as per (9). Therefore, due to the various co-
operation costs, the grand coalition of all users will seldom
form (it only forms only in very favorable conditions which
can be quite unrealistic in a large scale wireless network) and
hence, the network structure consists of disjoint independent
coalitions.
As a result of Property 2, the proposed eavesdroppers co-
operation game is classified as a coalition formation game
due to the presence of cooperation costs and the fact that
the grand coalition is not always the optimal solution [19,
Sec. IV]. Consequently, solutions for canonical coalitional
games such as the core may not be applicable. In fact, for the
core of any coalitional game to exist as a solution concept,
the game must ensure that the grand coalition of all play-
ers will form, and in addition, due to the non-transferable
nature of the game, the mapping V must verify certain con-
ditions [18, Chap. 9], [19]. However, as seen in Fig. 1 and
corroborated by Property 2, the cost for coalition formation
will generally forbid the formation of the grand coalition.
Instead, a network composed of independent and disjoint
coalitions will form as a result of the cooperative beamform-
ing performed among the eavesdroppers. Therefore, the pro-
posed game is a coalition formation game and the objective
is to derive a distributed algorithm that will lead to coali-
tional structures such as the one shown in Fig. 1.
4. DISTRIBUTED EAVESDROPPERS COA-
LITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
4.1 Coalition Formation Algorithm
Coalition formation games have been a topic of high inter-
est in game theory [20, 21] and have recently also attracted
attention in wireless and communication networks [19]. The
goal is to find algorithms for characterizing the coalitional
structures that form in a network where the grand coali-
tion is not optimal. By using game theoretical concepts
from coalition formation games, we introduce a distributed
coalition formation algorithm for the proposed (K, V ) eaves-
droppers cooperation game. First, we require the following
definitions [21]:
Definition 2. A collection of coalitions, denoted by S, is
defined as the set S = {S1, . . . , Sl} of mutually disjoint coali-
tions Si ⊂ K. In other words, a collection is any arbitrary
group of disjoint coalitions Si of K not necessarily spanning
all players of K. If the collection spans all the players of K;
that is
⋃l
j=1 Sj = K, the collection is a partition of K.
Definition 3. A preference operator or comparison re-
lation ¤ is an order defined for comparing two collections
R = {R1, . . . , Rl} and S = {S1, . . . , Sp} that are partitions
of the same subset A ⊆ K (i.e. same players in R and S).
Therefore, R ¤ S implies that the way R partitions A is
preferred to the way S partitions A.
Several well known preference relations can be used in var-
ious scenarios [19, 21]. These orders can be divided into
two categories: Coalition value orders and individual value
orders. Coalition value orders compare two collections (or
partitions) using the value function of the coalitions inside
these collections (suitable for games with transferable util-
ities) while individual value orders perform the comparison
using the individual payoffs of every player. For the individ-
ual orders, two collectionsR and S are seen as two vectors of
individual payoffs of the same length (corresponding to the
total number of players) where each element of these payoff
vectors corresponds to the utility received by the players in
each coalition Ri ∈ R and Si ∈ S. In this context, indi-
vidual value orders are quite suitable for non-transferable
utility games such as the proposed game. Hence, we de-
fine the following individual order that can be used in the
eavesdroppers cooperation game:
Definition 4. Consider two collections R = {R1, . . . , Rl}
and S = {S1, . . . , Sm} that are partitions of the same sub-
set A ⊆ K (same players in R and S). For a collection
R = {R1, . . . , Rl}, let the utility of a player j in a coali-
tion Rj ∈ R be denoted by Φj(R) = φj(Rj) ∈ V (Rj). R is
preferred over S by Pareto order, written as R¤ S, iff
R¤ S ⇐⇒ {Φj(R) ≥ Φj(S) ∀ j ∈ R,S}, (11)
with at least one strict inequality(>) for a player k
In other words, a collection is preferred by the players over
another collection, if at least one player is able to improve
its payoff without hurting the other players. For performing
the coalition formation process among the eavesdroppers,
we construct an algorithm based on two simples operations,
so called “merge” and “split” rules, borrowed from coalition
formation games [21] and defined as follows:
Definition 5. Merge Rule - Merge any set of coali-
tions {S1, . . . , Sl} whenever the merged form is preferred by
the players, i.e., where {
⋃l
j=1 Sj} ¤ {S1, . . . , Sl}, therefore,
{S1, . . . , Sl} → {
⋃l
j=1 Sj}.
Definition 6. Split Rule - Split any coalition
⋃l
j=1 Sj
whenever a split form is preferred by the players, i.e., where
{S1, . . . , Sl}¤ {
⋃l
j=1 Sj}, thus, {
⋃l
j=1 Sj} → {S1, . . . , Sl}.
By utilizing the merge rule, a number of coalitions can co-
operate and form a larger coalition if this merge yields a
preferred collection based on the Pareto order. This implies
that a group of players can agree to form a larger coalition,
if at least one of the players improves its payoff without de-
creasing the utilities of any of the other players. Similarly, an
existing coalition can decide to split into smaller coalitions
if splitting yields a preferred collection by Pareto order. The
rationale behind these rules is that, once the players agree to
sign a merge agreement, this agreement can only be broken
if all the players approve. This is a family of coalition for-
mation games known as coalition formation games with par-
tially reversible agreements [20]. For the (K, V ) eavesdrop-
pers cooperation coalition formation game, the merge and
split rules are suitable for forming the eavesdroppers coali-
tions due to numerous reasons. First, every merge or split
decision can be taken individually, in a distributed manner
by the eavesdroppers (or coalition of eavesdroppers). More-
over, as proven in [21] any algorithm built on iterations of
merge and split will converge to a final partition, due to
the nature of the preference relations used. Therefore, these
rules can be used as building blocks in a coalition formation
process for the eavesdroppers coalition formation game.
However, since the Pareto order defined in (11) relies on a
comparison of the instantaneous payoffs (secrecy capacities)
φk(S) (for any eavesdropper k in any coalition S) as given
by (9), performing merge or split using this order requires a
full knowledge of the channel gain including the fading am-
plitude as per (3). Due to the fact that the fading amplitude
varies from one slot to the other, utilizing the Pareto order
as in (11) may require performing merge and split every slot
within every eavesdropping cycle, which can be a tedious
task on the eavesdroppers. In addition, merging or splitting
based on the instantaneous channel gains requires a continu-
ous estimation of the instantaneous fading amplitude of the
channel, which can again be quite a complex process.
For this purpose, and in order to avoid this complexity,
we propose a far sighted approach to the merge and split
rules whereby the eavesdroppers use the Pareto order in (11)
based on their long term payoff φ¯k(S) = u¯(S), which is de-
fined as the payoff that the eavesdroppers receive during
an eavesdropping cycle averaged over the fading amplitude
realizations. As we consider a quasi-static channel model,
one can easily see using (3) and (9) that the secrecy ca-
pacities, and payoffs φ¯k(S) averaged over the channel real-
izations will depend mainly on the path loss (distance) be-
tween the nodes (eavesdropper-eavesdropper, eavesdropper-
user, or user-BS). Consequently, we propose that the eaves-
droppers utilize a coalition formation algorithm based on far
sighted merge and split rules that are constructed using the
Pareto order in (11) applied to the long term average pay-
offs φ¯k(S) which are given by (9) when using the averaged
channel gains. In this regard, any coalition formation algo-
rithm based on the far sighted merge and split rules would
no longer require a knowledge of the instantaneous fading
amplitude as the decisions are based on long term utilities
averaged over the fading amplitude.
Accordingly, for the eavesdroppers coalitional game, we con-
struct a coalition formation algorithm based on far sighted
merge-and-split operations and divided into three phases:
neighbor discovery, adaptive far sighted coalition formation,
and cooperative eavesdropping. In the neighbor discovery
phase (Phase 1), each coalition (or eavesdropper) surveys its
neighborhood for locating nearby eavesdroppers with whom
cooperation is possible. At the end of this phase, each coali-
tion would construct a list of its neighboring partners and
proceeds to the next phase of the algorithm.
Following Phase 1, the adaptive far sighted coalition for-
mation phase (Phase 2) debuts, whereby the coalitions (or
individual eavesdroppers) interact with their neighbors for
assessing whether to form new coalitions or whether to break
their current coalition. For this purpose, an iteration of se-
quential far sighted merge-and-split rules occurs in the net-
work, whereby each coalition decides to merge (or split) de-
pending on the long term utility improvement that merging
(or splitting) yields. This phase starts from an initial net-
work partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of K. Subsequently, any
random coalition (individual eavesdropper) can start with
the merge process. For practicality purposes, consider that
the coalition Ti ∈ T which has the highest long term util-
ity in the initial partition T starts by attempting to merge
with a nearby coalition. On one hand, if merging occurs,
a new coalition of eavesdroppers T˜i is formed and, in its
turn, T˜i will attempt to merge with nearby eavesdroppers
(coalitions), if possible. On the other hand, if Ti is unable
to merge with the firstly discovered neighbor, it tries to find
other coalitions that have a mutual benefit in merging. The
search ends with a final merged coalition T finali composed of
the eavesdroppers in Ti and one or several of coalitions in its
vicinity (T finali = Ti, if no merge occurred). The algorithm
is repeated for the remaining Ti ∈ T until all the coali-
tions have made their merge decisions, resulting in a final
partition F . Following the merge process, the coalitions in
the resulting partition F can next perform split operations,
if any is possible. An iteration consisting of multiple suc-
cessive merge-and-split operations is repeated until it con-
verges. The convergence of an iteration of merge and split
rules is guaranteed as shown in [21]. Note that the decisions
to merge or split can be taken in a distributed way by the
eavesdroppers without relying on any centralized entity.
In the cooperative eavesdropping phase (Phase 3), within
every slot of an eavesdropping cycle, the coalitions exchange
their information and begin their cooperative eavesdropping
process, in a time slotted manner, one coalition per slot.
Hence, in this phase, the eavesdroppers coalitions perform
the actual receive beamforming, for efficiently tapping into
the signal of the network’s users within the corresponding
slot. Each round of the proposed algorithm consists of these
three phases, and is summarized in Table 1. For a stationary
network, the last phase of the algorithm, i.e., the coopera-
tive eavesdropping phase, is performed continuously over a
large number of eavesdropping cycles. On the other hand,
in a network where the eavesdroppers and/or the users are
mobile, periodic runs of the first two phases of the proposed
algorithms are performed which allows the eavesdroppers to
autonomously self-organize and adapt the network’s topol-
ogy through appropriate merge-and-split decisions during
Phase 2. This adaptation to environmental changes is per-
formed in mobile networks periodically every M eavesdrop-
ping cycles. In general, the number of cycles M can be
chosen arbitrarily but, for adapting to mobility, M must
be smaller as mobility increases in order to allow adequate
adaptation of the network.
The proposed algorithm in Table 1 can be implemented in
a distributed manner. At the beginning of time, the eaves-
droppers can detect the strength of the users’ uplink signals,
and, thus, estimate the location of these users. Note that,
due to the far sighted merge-and-split rules considered, the
eavesdroppers are not required to estimate the instantaneous
fading amplitude of the channel (only an estimate of the
users’ locations is needed for evaluating the long term pay-
offs needed for coalition formation). Further, nearby coali-
tions (eavesdroppers) can be discovered in Phase 1 through
techniques similar to those used in the ad hoc routing dis-
covery process [22]. Once the neighbors are discovered and
the users’ locations are estimated, the coalitions can perform
merge operations based in Phase 2. Moreover, each formed
coalition can also internally decide to split if its members
find a preferred split structure. During Phase 3, within ev-
ery slot, the distributed eavesdroppers would exchange their
information (channels, control, etc.) and then cooperate to
perform receive beamforming using the cooperative protocol
described in Section 2.2.
4.2 Partition Stability
The stability of any network partition resulting from the
proposed algorithm in Table 1 can be investigated using the
Table 1: One round of the proposed eavesdroppers
coalition formation algorithm
Initial State
The network is partitioned by T = {T1, . . . , Tk} (At the
beginning of all time T = K = {1, . . . , K} with non-cooperative
eavesdroppers).
Three phases in each round of the eavesdroppers coalition
formation algorithm
Phase 1 - Neighbor Discovery:
a) Each coalition of eavesdroppers surveys its neighborhood
for candidate partners.
Phase 2 - Adaptive Far Sighted Coalition Formation:
In this phase, coalition formation among the eavesdroppers
using far sighted merge-and-split occurs.
repeat
a) F = Merge(T ); coalitions in T decide to merge based
on the algorithm described in Section 4.1.
b) T = Split(F); coalitions in F decide to split based on
the Pareto order (using long term payoffs).
until merge-and-split converges.
Phase 3 - Cooperative Eavesdropping:
a) During every slot of an eavesdropping cycle, every
coalition’s eavesdroppers exchange their information and
then perform receive beamforming for launching an efficient
attack on the users (one user attacked per slot, Section 2.2)
b) For networks where the eavesdroppers and users are
stationary, this phase is repeated continuously for a large
number of eavesdropping cycles.
For networks where environmental changes such as mobil-
ity may occur, the above three phases are repeated peri-
odically every M eavesdropping cycles.
concept of a defection function [21].
Definition 7. A defection function D is a function which
associates with each partition T of K a group of collections
in K. A partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of K is D-stable if no
group of players benefits from leaving T when the players
who leave can only form the collections allowed by D.
For the eavesdroppers coalition formation game, two defec-
tion functions are of interest [19,21]. First, the Dhp function
which associates with each partition T of K the group of all
partitions of K that can form through merge or split and
the Dc function which associates with each partition T of
K the group of all collections in K. The function Dc allows
any group of players to leave the partition T of K through
any operation and create an arbitrary collection in K. Two
forms of stability stem from these definitions: Dhp stability
and a stronger Dc stability. A partition T is Dhp-stable, if no
player in T benefits from leaving T through merge-and-split
to form other partitions in K; while a partition T is Dc-
stable, if no player in T is benefits from leaving T through
any operation (not necessarily merge or split) to form other
collections in K.
Characterizing any type of D-stability for a network parti-
tion depends on various properties of the coalitions that have
formed. For instance, a partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of K is
Dhp-stable if, for the partition T , no coalition has an incen-
tive to merge or split. An immediate result of this definition
of Dhp-stability is the following:
Lemma 1. Every partition resulting from the coalition
formation algorithm proposed for the eavesdroppers cooper-
ation game in Table 1 is Dhp-stable.
In other words, a Dhp-stable partition can be thought of as
a state of equilibrium where no coalitions have an incen-
tive to pursue coalition formation through merge or split.
Furthermore, a Dc-stable partition T is characterized by be-
ing a strongly stable partition, which satisfies the following
properties: (i)- A Dc-stable partition is Dhp-stable, (ii)- A
Dc-stable partition is a unique outcome of any iteration of
merge-and-split, and (ii)- A Dc-stable partition T is a unique
¤-maximal partition, that is for all partitions T ′ 6= T of K,
T ¤ T ′. In the case where ¤ represents the Pareto order,
this implies that the Dc-stable partition T is the partition
that presents a Pareto optimal utility distribution for all the
players.
Clearly, it is desirable that the network self-organizes unto a
Dc-stable partition when possible. However, the existence of
a Dc-stable partition is not always guaranteed [21]. The Dc-
stable partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of the whole space K exists
if a partition of K that verifies the following two necessary
and sufficient conditions exists [21]:
1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and each pair of disjoint coali-
tions S1 and S2 such that {S1 ∪ S2} ⊆ Ti we have
{S1 ∪ S2}¤ {S1, S2}.
2. For the partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl}, a coalition G ⊂ K
formed of players belonging to different Ti ∈ T is T -
incompatible if for no i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we have G ⊂ Ti.
In summary, Dc-stability requires that for all T -incompatible
coalitions {G}[T ] ¤ {G} where {G}[T ] = {G ∩ Ti ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , l}} is the projection of coalition G on T . If no par-
tition of K can satisfy these conditions, then no Dc-stable
partition of K exists. Nevertheless, for the eavesdroppers
cooperation game, we have:
Lemma 2. For the proposed (K, v) eavesdroppers coali-
tional game, the proposed algorithm of Table 1 converges to
the optimal Dc-stable partition, if such a partition exists.
Otherwise, the final network partition is Dhp-stable.
Proof. This result is a consequence of Lemma 1 and the
fact that the Dc-stable partition is a unique outcome of any
merge-and-split iteration [21] which is the case with any par-
tition resulting from our algorithm.
For the proposed game, in order to satisfy the first con-
dition for existence of the Dc-stable partition, the eaves-
droppers that are members of each coalition must verify
the Pareto order through their long term payoff vectors as
given by (9) and (10) averaged over the fading amplitude
realizations. Similarly, for verifying the second condition of
Dc stability, eavesdroppers belonging to all T -incompatible
coalitions in the network must also verify the Pareto order.
Consequently, the existence of such a Dc-stable partition is
closely tied to the location of the eavesdroppers through the
long term individual payoffs (long term secrecy capacities)
as well as the locations of the eavesdroppers and users in
the network. Hence, the existence of the Dc-stable parti-
tion strongly depends on the positions of the users and the
eavesdroppers, which, in a practical large scale ad hoc wire-
less network are generally random and may be time varying.
Therefore, the existence of the Dc-stable partition cannot be
always guaranteed in the eavesdroppers cooperation game.
However, despite this limitation, the proposed algorithm will
always guarantee convergence to this optimal Dc-stable par-
tition when it exists as stated in Lemma 2. Whenever a
Dc-stable partition does not exist, the coalition structure
resulting from the proposed algorithm will be a sub-optimal
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Figure 2: A snapshot of a coalitional structure re-
sulting from our proposed coalition formation algo-
rithm for a network with K = 10 eavesdroppers, and
N = 10 users (circles).
Dhp-stable partition (no coalition or individual user is able
to merge or split any further).
5. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, a square network of 4 km × 4 km is set up
with the BS located at the center, the eavesdroppers ran-
domly placed at the upper 4 × 2 rectangle while the users
are randomly deployed within the lower 4×2 rectangle. The
simulation parameters used are as follows: First, the number
of bits for information exchange is taken as L = 128 bits, the
power constraint per eavesdropper/user is P˜ = 10 mW, the
noise level is −90 dBm, the channel propagation loss is set to
α = 3, and the bandwidth is W = 100 kHz. The Doppler fre-
quency is set to 10 Hz (stationary/very low mobility) which
yields a coherence time (slot duration) of 42.3 ms.
In Fig. 2, we show a snapshot of the network structure re-
sulting from the proposed coalition formation algorithm for
a randomly deployed network with K = 10 eavesdroppers,
and N = 10 users. This figure shows how the eavesdroppers
can cooperate and self-organize into 4 coalitions with the
resulting network structure T = {T1, T2, T3, T4}. For exam-
ple, Eavesdropper 2 is unable to find any nearby partner to
improve his payoff and hence decides to act alone. In con-
trast, Eavesdroppers 5 and 9 merge into a single coalition
T1 = {5, 9} due to the fact that V ({5, 9}) = {φ({5, 9}) =
[−135 ·104, −135 ·104]} which is a clear improvement on the
non-cooperative utilities which were φ5({5}) = −177.32 ·10
4
and φ9({9}) = −174.44 · 10
4 (recall the minus sign in the
utilities is inserted to turn the problem into a maximization
problem). Similar results can also be seen for the forma-
tion of coalitions T3 and T4. In a nutshell, Fig. 2 shows how
the eavesdroppers can self-organize into disjoint independent
coalitions for performing cooperative eavesdropping through
receive beamforming.
In Fig. 3 we show how the algorithm can handle mobility
through appropriate coalition formation decisions. For this
purpose, the network setup of Fig. 2 is considered while
Eavesdropper 4 is moving horizontally for 0.35 km in the di-
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Figure 3: Self-adaptation of the network’s topology
to mobility as Eavesdropper 4 in Figure 2 moves
horizontally on the negative x-axis.
rection of the negative x-axis. As mobility starts, Eavesdrop-
per 4 distances itself from its cooperating partners Eaves-
droppers 1 and 10, hence its payoff (long term) drops. As
Eavesdropper 4 moves 0.2 km, it splits from coalition {1, 4, 10}
and decides to act alone. This split is a result of the increase
in the cost for information exchange due to Eavesdropper 4
distancing itself from its coalition partners 1 and 10 as well
as the proximity of Eavesdropper 4 to the network’s users
(notably Users 4 and 6) which allows these users to tap into
the information exchange phase, hence increasing the cost
as per (7) and (8). In fact, when Eavesdropper 4 moves
0.2 km, the payoffs achieved by Eavesdroppers 1, 4, and 10
when acting within coalition {1, 4, 10} are V ({1, 4, 10}) =
{φ({1, 4, 10}) = [−98.75 · 104, −98.75 · 104, −98.75 · 104]}
which are much smaller than the payoffs achieved by these
eavesdroppers if they split into {1, 10} and {4} (once they
split V ({1, 10}) = {φ({1, 10}) = [−59.41 · 104, −59.41 ·
104, −59.41 · 104]} and φ4{4} = −69.81 · 10
4). As Eaves-
dropper 4 moves 0.35 km, it merges with Eavesdroppers 5
and 9, forming a three-eavesdropper coalition {4, 5, 9} while
all three eavesdroppers improve their payoffs. Similar results
can also be observed when all the eavesdroppers (or users)
are moving, but are omitted due to space limitation.
In Fig. 4, for a network having N = 10 users, we show the
payoff (secrecy capacity reduction) per eavesdropper achieved
per eavesdropping cycle during a period of around 4.2 min-
utes, i.e., M = 600 eavesdropping cycles (each eavesdrop-
ping cycle consists of N = 10 slots) averaged over the ran-
dom locations of the eavesdroppers and the users, as a func-
tion of the eavesdroppers network size K. The payoff shown
is the actual payoff achieved by the eavesdroppers over this
period given the instantaneous fading amplitudes of the chan-
nel following the coalition formation process. We compare
the performance of the proposed eavesdroppers coalition for-
mation algorithm to that of the non-cooperative case. For
the cooperative case, the average eavesdropper’s payoff in-
creases with the number of eavesdroppers since the possibil-
ity of finding cooperating partners increases. Moreover, this
increase is interpreted by the fact that, as more eavesdrop-
pers are available, the efficiency of attacking several users
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Figure 4: Payoff per eavesdropper per eavesdrop-
ping cycle (averaged over random locations of the
eavesdroppers and users) achieved during M =
600 eavesdropping cycles (around 4 minutes) in a
network with N = 10 users as the number of eaves-
droppers K varies.
also improves. In contrast, the non-cooperative approach
presents an almost constant performance with different net-
work sizes. Clearly, in Fig. 4, we can see that cooperation
presents a significant advantage over the non-cooperative
case in terms of average payoff per eavesdropper per eaves-
dropping cycle for all network sizes, and this advantage in-
creases with K reaching up to 27.6% of improvement relative
to the non-cooperative case at K = 40 eavesdroppers. In
summary, Fig. 4 shows that by using the proposed coalition
formation algorithm, the eavesdroppers can significantly im-
prove the damage that they cause on the network users, i.e.,
reduce the secrecy capacities of these users.
In Fig. 5, for a network of N = 10 users, we evaluate the
average and maximum coalition size (averaged over random
locations of the eavesdroppers and users) resulting from the
proposed coalition formation algorithm as the number of
eavesdroppers K increases. In this figure, we can see that, as
the number of eavesdroppers K increases, both the average
and maximum coalition sizes increase. This is a direct result
of the fact that, as K increases, the possibility of finding a
cooperating partner becomes higher for all eavesdroppers.
Further, by inspecting the average coalition size in Fig. 5,
we remark that the coalitions resulting from the proposed
algorithm are generally small, as the average coalition size
does not exceed 4 for a network with K = 40 eavesdroppers.
This result highlights the limitation that the cooperation
costs impose on the network. Nonetheless, in some scenar-
ios, large coalitions may emerge as seen through the average
maximum coalition size shown in Fig. 5 which can reach
around 8 for a network of K = 40 eavesdroppers. In a nut-
shell, Fig. 5 shows that, on the average, the network topol-
ogy is composed of a large number of small coalitions rather
than a small number of large coalitions, with the emergence
of some large coalitions occasionally.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a model for cooperation among
the eavesdroppers in a wireless network and we studied the
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aged over random locations of the eavesdroppers
and users ) coalition size achieved in a network with
N = 10 users vs. the number of eavesdroppers K.
behavior, topology, and dynamics of the eavesdroppers’ net-
work through coalition formation games. In the introduced
model, a number of single antenna eavesdroppers interact for
forming cooperative coalitions that can utilize receive beam-
forming techniques to improve their attacks on the wireless
users. We modeled the problem as a non-transferable coali-
tional game and classified it as a coalition formation game.
Further, we proposed a coalition formation algorithm based
on distributed rules of merge and split that allow the eaves-
droppers to take autonomous decisions to form or break
a coalition depending on their utility improvement. The
utility of every coalition corresponds to the overall secrecy
capacity reduction that the coalition can inflict on the net-
work’s users over the duration of an eavesdropping cycle. We
studied the properties of the proposed coalition formation al-
gorithm, we characterized the resulting network structures,
we studied its stability, and analyzed the self-adaptation
of the topology to environmental changes such as mobility.
Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm allows
the eavesdroppers to self-organize while improving the aver-
age payoff per eavesdropper up to 27.6% per eavesdropping
cycle relative to the non-cooperative case. Finally, future
work will consider cooperative defense mechanisms (against
the eavesdroppers cooperation) for the users as well as dis-
cuss any possible equilibria, in terms of network partitions
(at both the eavesdroppers and users sides), that can re-
sult when both the eavesdroppers and the users engage in
coalition formation simultaneously.
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